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Proving Patent
Infringement under the
Doctrine of Equivalents:
The Specific Evidentiary
Requirements for
Getting to the Jury
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., Inc.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine trying a case before a jury, getting a verdict in your favor, along

with an award of $2.8 million in damages, only to have it all set aside on
appeal because your evidence was "fatally deficient."2 This unfortunate
sequence of events recently happened to Lear Siegler, Inc. when they sued
3
Sealy Mattress Company of Michigan, Inc. for patent infringement. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted Sealy Mattress
Co.'s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because Lear
Siegler, Inc.'s evidentiary showing under the patent law "doctrine of
equivalents,"4 a theory of patent infringement, was insufficient.5 This Note
will examine the Federal Circuit's evidentiary requirements for proving
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and demonstrate how to get a
doctrine of equivalents case to the jury.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT
In order to understand the doctrine of equivalents and the issues raised
in Lear Siegler, one must first have a basic understanding of what a patent is
and how it is infringed. A patent is a grant issued by the United States
government giving the patent owner the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the patented invention in the United States for a specified

1. 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 1427.
3. Id. at 1423-24.
4. See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
5. Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426-27.
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number of years. A patentee (i.e., inventor) acquires a patent by initially
filing a patent application with the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark
Office. This initial filing begins a long process, which often takes several
years, of negotiating with the Patent Office on the patentability of the
invention.8 These negotiations are often referred to as the patent prosecution
process.9
The patent application must contain a specification"0 which "shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. "
The patented invention is defined by the scope of these claims. 12 A patent
claim contains subdivisions, or "elements." 3 These claim elements are

6. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982); R. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S
1 (1988). Congress' power to enact patent statutes stems from the United
States Constitution which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power... [t]o
promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The current patent statutes are codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376
(1982).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
8. S.JONES, THE PATENT OFFIcE 39 (1971).
GUIDE

9. R. HILDRETH, supra note 6, at 13.

10. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
See also Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("[T]he
specification... describe[s] the manner and process of making and using the patent
so that any person skilled in the patent's art may utilize it.").
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
12. Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 365 U.S. 336,
344-46 (1961); Autogiro Co., 384 F.2d at 395 ("The claims of the patent provide the
concise formal definition of the invention.").
13. One of the most confusing aspects of this note is that the word "elements" has
two unrelated meanings. "Elements" is-used to refer to each of the three parts of the
Graver Tank function/way/result equivalency test, and "elements" is also used to refer
to limitations set forth in a patent claim. The reader should be aware of the different
uses. The author has tried to use language which indicates which meaning is being
used. For example, the phrase "GraverTank elements" refers to the three parts of the
equivalency test; the phrase "claim elements" refers to limitations in a patent claim.
Avoiding this double meaning, however, is impossible because the case law uses
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/9
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"limitation[s]of a claim that count[] in determining both [patent] validity and
infringement."' 4
In general, a patent is infringed when someone makes, uses, or sells the
patented device in the United States during the term of the patent without the
patent owner's authority.s There are two types of infringement: 1) literal
infringement, and 2) infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 6 Literal
infringement occurs when the accused device embodies every element and
limitation of at least one claim of the patent.' 7 In other words, at least one
patent claim must "read[] directly, unequivocally, and word-for-word on" the
accused device. 8
"The doctrine of equivalents comes into play only when actual literal
infringement is not present."' 9 Many times the accused device contains
minor changes and substitutions such that the patent owner's claims do not
literally "read on" the accused device; in these situations there is no literal
infringement." In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Linde Air
Products Co.,2' however, the United States Supreme Court recognized:
that to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every
literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a
hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would leave room for-indeed
encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial
changes and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would
be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside
the reach of law ....
The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to

"elements" interchangeably.
Furthermore, the phrase "claim elements" as is used in this note refers to the
limitations in a patent claim, rather than the structural part of the accused device or an
embodiment of the invention. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822
F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In other words, the phrase "claim elements" is
used as it is used in the phrase "[a]n element in a claim" in 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6
(1982).
14. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
16. Adelman and Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions That PennwaltDid Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 679-80 (1989).
17. Stewart Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, Mich., 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
18. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en
banc).
19. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
20. See SRI Int'l, 775 F.2d at 1123.
21. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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this experience. The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice
a fraud on a patent.22
The Graver Tank court went on to hold that infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents may be found, where there is no literal infringement, when the
accused device "performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result" as the patented device.' This test is
often referred to as the "function/way/result" equivalence test.24 Graver Tank
is considered to embody the modern formulation of the doctrine of equivalents."
26
III. LEAR SIEGLER, INC. V. SEALY MATTRESS Co., INC.

A. The Facts
Plaintiff Lear Siegler, Inc. (LSI) owns two patents which claim box
spring assemblies for use in conventional beds. 27 The box spring assemblies
incorporate "isolated, non-contacting, modular torsion bar springs."8 The
modular torsion bar springs, which are the focus of this controversy, are
claimed in one of LSI's patents. 29 Following the issuance of LSI's patents,
defendant Sealy Mattress Company of Michigan, Inc. (Sealy) developed,
manufactured, and sold its own box spring assemblies which included
"individual, non-contacting, torsional springs"30 very similar to LSI's modular
torsion bar springs. 3'

22. Id. at 607-08.
23. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 208 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)) (emphasis added).
24. Adelman and Francione, supra note 16, at 687. The case law often uses the
word "way" interchangeably with the word "means." Thus, for purposes of this note,
the "function/way/result" test is the same as the "function/means/result" test.
25. Id. at 700. The doctrine of equivalents was first used in Winans v. Denmead,
56 U.S. 330 (1853), where the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he exclusive right to the
thing patened is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of
it, varying its form or proportions." 56 U.S. at 343.
26. 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
27. Id. at 1423.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 1423-24.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/9
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LSI sued Sealy in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan32 alleging that Sealy's springs infringed LSI's patents. 3 At
trial, which was heard by a jury, LSI sought to prove literal infringement by
contending that LSI's "claims read on Sealy's spring."3 4 Through the crossexamination testimony of Mr. Mizelle, the designer of the accused spring, LSI
alleged that Sealy's spring "incorporated all the features recited in [LSI's]
claims" and thus literally infringed LSI's patent.35
At the close of the evidence, Sealy moved for a directed verdict of noninfringement, arguing that because its springs did not embody certain elements
from LSI's patent claims, there could be no literal infringement.36 Sealy
further pointed out that "LSI's counsel ... neither explicitly relied on the
doctrine of equivalents nor specifically proved its elements. Thus,... LSI

did not delineate the elements of infringement under the doctrine ... sufficiently for the issue to reach the jury."3 7 In denying Sealy's
motion for directed verdict, the district court stated that there was sufficient
evidence of literal infringement for the jury to consider.38 Furthermore,
"considering the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable
inference of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents could be made by
the jury," the district court added.39

The only time that LSI's counsel referred to the doctrine of equivalents,
however, was during closing arguments when LSI reminded the jurors of the
cross-examination testimony of Mr. Mizelle. 40 LSI contended that "at least
a portion of [that] cross-examination testimony 'ha[d] to do with the
equivalents' and shows that if one takes Sealy's spring and just turned
portions around, and 'if you eliminate one of the torsion bars,

. .

.' one ends

up with LSI's claimed spring." 41 Apparently the district court considered this
reference to the doctrine to be sufficient for giving the issue to the jury.42

32. Id. at 1423.
33. Id. at 1424.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

40. Id. The portion of Mr. Mizelle's cross-examination testimony which relates
to the doctrine of equivalents is repeated infra, note 92.
41. Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1424 (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress
Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 84-CV-75319-DT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 1987)).
42. id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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The jury found that Sealy infringed LSI's patents under the doctrine of
equivalents and awarded LSI damages of $2,806,571. 43 Sealy moved for a
JNOV, or in the alternative, for a new trial." Sealy argued that under
Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp.-Lewisystems Div.4' LSI's showing of
6
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was inadequate. According
to Sealy, Nestier required LSI to "explicitly delineate to the jury, through
testimony and argument, equivalence of function, means, and result between
the claimed and accused springs, and that failing47such delineation in testimony
and argument, the jury's verdict cannot stand.,
The district court denied Sealy's motions for JNOV and for new trial,
reasoning that the Nestier requirements had been met.' Furthermore, the
district court distinguished Nestier: "in Nestier the plaintiff never expressly
relied on the doctrine of equivalents, while in this case the doctrine was in
issue '[flrom the beginning of the trial to the end.' 49 Sealy then appealed
the district court's denial of Sealy's alternative JNOV and new trial motions °
B. The Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed51
and held that "Nestler requires that the three Graver Tank elements [of
function, way, and result] must be presented in the form of particularized
testimony and linking argument" for a jury to find patent infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.52

43. Id.

The jury found no literal infringement.

Id.

Furthermore, literal

infringement was not an issue on appeal. Id. at 1425.
44. Id. at 1424.
45. 739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985).
46. Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1424-25.

47. Id. at 1425.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 84-CV75319-DT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 1987)).

50. Id.
51. Id. at 1423, 1427.

52. Id. at 1426.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/9
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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. The Range of EquivalenceAfforded to a Patent
The doctrine of equivalents will have varying breadth depending upon the
degree of the invention, that is, whether the invention is a pioneer invention
which discovers a new and very large scientific field, or just an improvement
patent which adds only a small improvement to a known field. 53 "[A]
greater degree of liberality and a wider range of equivalents are permitted
where the patent is of a pioneer character than when the invention is simply
an improvement.., in the5 4 art theretofore partially developed by other
inventors in the same field."

The breadth of the doctrine of equivalents, however, is limited by the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. s During the patent prosecution
process5 6 the inventor will often make concessions as to the scope of the
patent claims in order to secure patentability.57 The inventor is in effect
surrendering matter which she admits should not be covered by her patent.58
These concessions are recorded in the prosection history file, or "file
wrapper."5 9 The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, also known as "file
wrapper estoppel," 60 states that the patent owner may not later attempt to
broaden the patent claims under the doctrine of equivalents and allege

53. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 415
(1908); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) ("A pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents."); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (pioneer invention
entitled to very broad range of equivalents); Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Autogiro Co. v. United States,
384 F.2d 391, 400-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (pioneer patent will have broader range of
equivalence than improvement patent).
54. ContinentalPaperBag, 210 U.S. at 415 (quoting Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v.
American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406 (1905)). The Court also stated that "[t]he

range of equivalents depends upon the extent and nature of the invention. If the
invention is broad or primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be
correspondingly broad." Id. at 414 (quoting Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186,
207 (1894)).
55. Adelman and Francione, supra note 16, at 680; Autogiro Co. v. United States,
384 F.2d 391, 400-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967).

56. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
57. R. HILDRETH, supra note 6, at 30-34.
58. Id.

59. Autogiro Co., 384 F.2d at 398.
60. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983);

Autogiro Co., 384 F.2d at 398.
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infringement by matter which was surrendered during the patent prosecution
61
process.
B. Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents
As discussed above, a patent claim recites the elements and limitations
which define the the patentee's invention; furthermore, literal infringement
occurs when the accused device embodies every element of at least one claim
of the patent. 62 Therefore, determining whether there is literal infringement
is simply a process of going through a patent claim element-by-element and
63
demonstrating that the accused device embodies each of these elements.
Appropriately, this process has often been labeled the "element-by-element"
approach of proving infringement.'
There has been some confusion as to whether proving infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents requires an element-by-element approach or a socalled "entirety" approach.6
Infringement under the element-by-element
approach requires the accused device to embody an equivalent for each claim
element of the patent, whereas the entirety approach, often referred to as the
"invention as a whole" approach, requires only that the claimed invention and
the accused device be equivalent as "wholes" or in their "entireties. '
Recently, however, in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 67 the
Federal Circuit held that proving infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires an element-by-element approach, the same approach required in
proving literal infringement.6 The court stated that "[ilt is ...well settled
that each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order to find
infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its
substantial equivalent in the accused device." 69 The court held "that the

61. Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, Inc., 282 U.S. 784, 790 (1931); Loctite
Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Standard Oil Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Hughes Aircraft Co.,
717 F.2d at 1362; Autogiro Co., 384 F.2d at 400-01.
62. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
63. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Electric Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(en banc).
64. Adelman and Francione, supra note 16, at 677-78.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
68. Id. at 935.
69. Id. (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528,
1532-33 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551
(Fed. Cir. 1985))) (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/9
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district court correctly relied on an element-by-element comparison to
7
conclude that there was no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents." "
C. The Evidentiary Requirements
The Graver Tank court stated that "[a] finding of equivalence is a
The court suggested several forms of proof of
determination of fact."'
equivalence, including expert testimony, documents, texts, treatises, and
disclosures of the prior art.' These general suggestions, however, are the
extent of the court's attempt to articulate the evidence which must be
presented at trial in order to enable the jury to decide the factual issue of
equivalence. 73 The Court did not offer a specific method of presenting the
function/way/result equivalency test to the jury. 74
75
In Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp.-Lewisystems Division, the Federal
Circuit discussed in detail the evidence required to prove equivalence and the
76
In Nestier, the
method of presenting the equivalency test to the jury.
at trial;77
equivalents
of
plaintiffs never expressly relied on the doctrine
furthermore, the plaintiffs actually stated during a conference on the form of
the jury instructions that their theory was literal infringement and not the
doctrine of equivalents. 78 The plaintiffs then alleged that the trial court erred
because it did not instruct the jury on the doctrine.79 In affirming the trial
court, the Federal Circuit stated that "[a]t no time did Nestier's attorneys or
witnesses present evidence which was explicitly related to the jury in the
8
The
Graver Tank terms of equivalence of function, means, and result."
court explained that "[a]nalysis of equivalence involves those three factors,
and a jury cannot be expected to be able to make any such determination81
absent evidence and argument concerning the doctrine and each of its elements."
82
The Nestier decision, however, rests on alternative grounds; namely,
the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on the doctrine of equivalents

70. Id.
71. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 609-10.
74. See id.
75. 739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985).
76. Id. at 1579.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1580.
79. Id. at 1578.
80. Id. at 1579.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1580; Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1427.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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was proper because 1) the plaintiffs explicitly disavowed reliance on the
doctrine, and alternatively, 2) there was a lack of evidence to form a basis for
analysis of equivalence by the jury.83 Therefore, the court's discussion of the
evidence required to find equivalency can be considered only dicta because
84
Until Lear Siegler,
the case would have been decided the same without it.
the Federal Circuit had not firmly adopted a method for presenting the issue
of equivalency to a jury.
V. THE LEAR SIEGLER COURT'S ANALYSIS
Judge Michel, writing for the Federal Circuit, began the court's analysis
by citing Graver Tank and stating that "[i]nfringement under the doctrine of
equivalents 'does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every
respect,' but does require substantial identity of function, means, and
result."8 Specifically, the court stated that "substantial identity must be
proven with regard to all three elements of the doctrine specified in Graver
Tank: function performed, means by which function is performed, and result
achieved.,86
Citing Nestier, Judge Michel added that "a jury must be separately
directed to the proof of each Graver Tank element."87 Furthermore, the
evidence of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents "cannot merely be
subsumed in the plaintiff's case of literal infringement."' The plaintiff must
compare "the function, means, and result of its claimed invention with those
of the accused device." 89 Without this comparison, the court stated that "a
jury is more or less put to sea without guiding charts when called upon to
determine infringement under the doctrine."9' The Federal Circuit summarized by holding that "Nestierrequires that the three Graver Tank elements [of
presented in the form of particularized
function, way, and result] must be
91
argument.
linking
and
testimony
Judge Michel reviewed the cross-examination testimony of Mr. Mizelle,
the designer of the accused spring.92 According to the court, this testimony

83. Nestier, 739 F.2d at 1580; Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1427.

84. Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1427.
85. Id. at 1425 (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609).

86. Id. (emphasis in original).
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id. at 1425-26.
90. Id.
91. Id.

92. Id. at 1426.
testimony states:

The relevant portion of Mr. Mizelle's cross-examination

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/9
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is all that LSI relied on as compliance with the evidentiary requirements of
Nestler.93 The Federal Circuit pointed out two deficiencies in LSI's
evidence. 4 First, the evidence "learly... was not broken down into the
three Graver Tank elements as required by Nestler."5 Second, the only
attempt to make an argument linking the three GraverTank elements together
was during closing argument when LSI's counsel stated that Mr. Mizelle's
The court found all of this
testimony "has to do with 97the equivalents."'
deficient."
"fatally
evidence
Judge Michel discussed the distinctions between this case and Nestier.98
The court pointed out that in Nestler the plaintiffs expressly stated that the
doctrine of equivalents was not their theory, and alleged that the district court
erred in not instructing the jury on the doctrine. 99 Whereas, in this case LSI
referred to the doctrine in their closing argument and never disavowed it;
furthermore, the jury was instructed on the doctrine." ° The Federal Circuit,

Q: Now, if you took Plaintiff's Exhibit #2-1 have got two left over-if
you took those [torsion bar spring members] out and threw them away and
you swung this around, that would be the same design, wouldn't it?
A: I don't know.
Q: Well, take a look at it. You have been designing these a lot longer than me
and I didn't have any trouble figuring it out. If I am wrong, you straighten me out.
It would be the same as Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, wouldn't it, Mr. Mizelle?
A: If wishes were horses, beggers [sic] would ride ....
Q: Well, just by looking at it, would you agree it is the same configuration.
A: What you have done is you have taken and made a whole different spring out
of what you had.
Q: Perhaps. I am not arguing with you. I just want to know whether you agree.
A: You can do anything you want to.
Q: If you took these two, cut this right here and cut it right here and put that up
thereA: Okay, if we didQ: Yes.
A: -and if your patent describes it that way, I would say you'd have the same
spring.
Id. (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 84-CV-75319DT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 1987)) (emphasis in original).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1427.
98. Id. at 1426-27.
99. Id. at 1426.
100. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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however, found these distinctions not critical. 01 While admitting that
Nestier's discussion of the proper method of presenting the Graver Tank
equivalency test to the jury could be considered dicta,'02 the court insisted
that "[n]evertheless, Nestier is binding precedent as to what Graver Tank
implicitly requires."' 0 3 In repeating the rationale of Nestier with approval,
Judge Michel observed that "if a jury is to rationally find all three elements
of equivalence, it must be told what evidence establishes the equivalence of
the claimed and accused devices as to each element."'04 Judge Michel
concluded that "[iln our view, the jury in this case was not so guided."' 05
The Federal Circuit held that the district court should not have instructed
the jury on the doctrine of equivalents because "there was neither argument
nor evidence explicitly setting forth equivalence of result, function, and
means."'06 Moreover, because of this error, the trial court should have
granted Sealy's motion for JNOV.'0 7

VI. THE EFFECT OF LEAR SIEGLER
ON PENNWALT'S ELEMENT-BY-ELEMENT APPROACH
OF PROVING INFRINGEMENT
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The Lear Siegler court did not discuss the specific evidence which must
be shown when proving infringement under Pennwalt's element-by-element
approach. °ss This section of the Note will attempt to explain how to satisfy
Lear Siegler's evidentiary requirements when proving equivalence under the
element-by-element approach.

-According to the Graver Tank function/way/result equivalency test, one
"object"'09 is considered legally equivalent to another "object" when there

101. Id.
102. Id. at 1427.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1426.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1425-27.
109. The word "object" is substituted for the word "device" in the Graver Tank
equivalency test. This substitution is made because Graver Tank's use of the word
"device" implies that the entirety approach, rather than the element-by-element
approach, should be used when proving infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
While not specifically addressing the issue, the Graver Tank court stated that "a
patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/9
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is substantial equivalency of function, way, and result."' In other words,
first, the two objects must perform substantially the same function."'
Second, the two objects must perform that function in substantially the same
way."' And third, the two objects must obtain the same result." 3 All
three parts of the test must be applied each time one object is equated to
another object." 4
Lear Siegler created two requirements which must be met in order for an
infringement case to get to the jury under a doctrine of equivalents theory of
infringement." 5 First, there must be particularized testimony for each part
of the Graver Tank equivalency test." 6 Namely, there must be separate
testimony showing that the two objects perform substantially the same
function, separate testimony showing that the two objects perform that
function in substantially the same way, and separate testimony showing that
the two objects obtain the same result." 7 Second, Lear Siegler requires an
argument linking the separate testimony addressing each of the three parts of
the test together to show that the two objects are indeed equivalent." 8
At first blush, the Graver Tank equivalency test and the Lear Siegler
evidentiary requirements for presenting the equivalency test to the jury seem
very straight forward. When one considers the issues raised by Pennwalt,
however, proving infringement under the doctrine of equivalents becomes

same result."' Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court stated that
"[t]he theory on which it is founded is that 'if two devices do the same work in
substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the
same, even though they differ in name, form or shape."' Id. (quoting Union Paper-Bag
Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)) (emphasis added). The context in
which "device" is used tends to imply that the "device" is the entire invention, rather
than just an element of a claim, leading to the conclusion that the equivalency test is
applied once to the entire invention. As already discussed, Pennwalt rejected the
entirety approach in favor of the element-by-element approach. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d
at 935.
110. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. The Graver Tank test is satified when an
alleged infringer seeks to appropriate an invention by making minor modifications in
order to avoid literal infringement of the patent claims. Carman Industries, Inc. v.
Wahl, 724 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1425-26.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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complicated. Pennwalt's element-by-element approach requires the accused
device to embody an equivalent for each element of the patent claim when
none of the claim elements are copied literally in the accused device. 19 For
purposes of applying the equivalency test, each claim element is an "object;"
therefore, a reasonable conclusion is that all three parts of the equivalency test
must be applied to each element in order to determine if each element's legal
equivalent is embodied in the accused device.120 For example, for a patent
having a single claim with five elements, none of which are copied literally
in the accused device, the entire equivalency test must be applied five times
in order to prove infringement. 2 ' Conversely, if Pennwalt had held that the
"entirety" or "invention as a whole" approach should be used, the entire
invention would be the "object," and the equivalency
test would only have to
22
be applied once in order to prove infringement.
A recent case which supports the conclusion stated above is Malta v.
Schulmerich Carillons,Inc.1" where the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania combined the equivalency test and the
Pennwaltelement-by-element approach. In Malta, the jury returned a verdict
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 2 4 In granting defendant's
motion for JNOV, the district court stated that "the deficiency that necessitates
setting aside plaintiffs' award" is that "[a] jury cannot make a factual finding
of equivalence without 'particularized testimony and linking argument." '
The court added that "[t]he evidentiary explanation is lacking as to
how... these features are 'buttons or the equivalent thereof.'... To uphold
this jury's finding would violate Graver Tank-Nestier-LearSiegler and would

reduce the doctrine of equivalents to a result oriented catch-all."'

6

119. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935.

120. As will be seen, this is the same conclusion reached by the court in Malta
v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., Civ. A. No. 85-5330 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Dist. Ct. Database).
121. See Malta, WESTLAW op. at 6-7. For purposes of this discussion, assume
there is no literal infringement, that is, that none of the claim elements are copied
literally in the accused device. In practice, however, many of the claim elements are
literally infringed by the accused device and an equivalent will only have to be found
for one or two elements. See R. HILDRETH, supra note 6, at 132-37. Therefore, the
equivalency test must be applied to only one or two elements which will reduce the
evidentiary compexities. See id.
122. See Adelman and Francione, supra note 16, at 677-78.
123. Civ. A. No. 85-5330 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, Dist. Ct.
Database).
124. Malta, WESTLAW op. at 3.
125. Malta, WESTLAW op. at 6 (quoting Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426).
126. Malta, WESTLAW op. at 9 (quoting trial transcript, T. 2.60-61, testimony
of
Mr.
Malta).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/9
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The Malta court, agreeing with the conclusion stated above as to the
application of the element-by-element approach, further stated that "[a] patentee... must substantiate all three aspects of equivalency, per Graver Tank,
as to each limitation of a claim in order to establish equivalence between
claim and accused device." 27 The district court made it clear that "Graver
Tank's,, tripartite requirements extend to each and every element of the
claim. 28
Assuming one accepts the above conclusions, that is, that the entire three
part Graver Tank equivalency test must be applied to each element of the
claim, satisfying Lear Siegler's evidentiary requirements will be no easy
chore, for a highly detailed evidentiary presentation is required. Each time the
equivalency test is applied to an element of the claim, three separate pieces
of particularized testimony will be required in order to address the equivalency
of function, way, and result between the claim element and an element in the
accused device. 29 Furthermore, a linking argument is required each time
the equivalency test is applied. 130 Therefore, in the above example of a
patent having a single claim with five elements, Lear Siegler requires a total
of fifteen separate pieces of particularized testimony131 and five linking
arguments 132 in order for the jury to decide the factual issue of equivalence.
The plaintiff must carefully organize her case to ensure that not one set of
testimony is left out. Indeed, with so many separate pieces of particularized
testimony, the jury might become confused and unable to properly fit all of
the testimony together when deciding whether the accused device infringes the
patent.
This highly detailed evidentiary presentation, however, may not be what
the Pennwalt court had in mind. A careful reading of Pennwalt indicates that
the Federal Circuit's main concern is ensuring that at least the second part of
the equivalency test (i.e., "way") is applied to each claim element. 33
Pennwalt states that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may be
found "if an accused device performs substantially the same overall function

127. Malta, WESTLAW op. at 6.
128. Malta, WESTLAW op. at 7.
129. See Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1425-26.

130. Id.
131. (5 applications of test) x (3parts of test, i.e., function/way/result) = 15 pieces
of particularized testimony.
132. (5 applications of test) x (1 linking argument per application of test) = 5
linking arguments.
133. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934-35. See also Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1987) C'[T]he critical
question ... is whether ...the claimed invention and the accused devices do not

operate in substantially the same way."). See also id. at 1531 n.6.
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or work, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same
overall result as the claimed invention."134 Furthermore, to be a substantial
equivalent, "the element substituted in the accused device for the element set
forth in the claim must not be such as would substantially change the way in
which the function of the claimed invention is performed."13 5 The court's
language implies that parts one and three of the equivalency test (i.e.,
"function" and "result") need to be applied only once to the "overall
invention" or the "claimed invention" rather than each claim element.1 36 It
follows that parts one and three of the equivalency test are applied on an
"entirety" or "invention as a whole" approach, and because Pennwalt clearly
adopts the element-by-element approach, the second part of the test is the only
part remaining which can be applied on an element-by-element approach. 37
Two commentators have interpreted Pennwalt in this same manner.138
They suggest that Pennwalt's adoption of the element-by-element approach
"did not mean that the entire function/way/result test needed to be applied to
each element." '39 Furthermore, they state that "[t]here can be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents ...

if an element has been changed in

the accused device and the changed element does not operate in substantially
the same way."' 40 The commentators did not say that the individual
changed element must have substantially the same function and result as the
claimed element.14 ' Therefore, they feel that Pennwalt requires that only the
second part of the equivalency test need be applied on an element-by-element
approach.42
Satisfying Lear Siegler's evidentiary requirements becomes easier when
only the "way" part of the equivalency test must be applied on an element-byelement'approach. Turning back to the example above of a patent having a
single claim with five elements, the "function" and "result" parts are applied
once to the entire invention and thus require only two pieces of particularized
testimony to prove infringement. The "way" part is applied once to each of
the five elements and requires five separate pieces of particularized testimony.
Therefore, only seven separate pieces of particularized testimony are required
as opposed to fifteen. The number of linking arguments required is less clear.

134. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 935 (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822
F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 934-35.
137. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
138. Adelman and Francione, supra note 16, at 687-88.
139. Id. at 687.
140. Id. at 688.
141. See id. at 687-88.
142. See id.
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The safe method is to still require five linking arguments, that is, one
argument linking the "way" in which each element functions to the overall
function and result of the accused device. Surely a jury's task of fitting
together and understanding a doctrine of equivalents case will be easier when
there are fewer pieces of particularized testimony.
VII. CONCLUSION
When applying the Graver Tank equivalency test to prove patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, there must be particularized testimony
and linking argument comparing the equivalence of function, way, and result
of the two objects sought to be equated.143 Furthermore, infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents must be proven under the element-by-element
approach, that is, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the accused device
embodies every element of at least one claim of the patent. 44 Therefore,
a reasonable conclusion is that the equivalency test, along with three pieces
of particularized testimony, must be applied to each element of a patent
claim.145 A closer examination of Pennwalt, however, reveals that only the
"way" part of the equivalency test needs to be applied under the element-byelement approach, and the "function" and "result" parts can be applied under
the "entirety" or "invention as a whole" approach. 46 Thus, because only
one part of the equivalency test needs to be applied under the element-byelement approach, only one piece of particularized testimony must be applied
to each element of the patent claim, and the total amount of testimony
required to prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is reduced. 47

RICHARD E. WAWRZYNIAK

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1425-26.
Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934-35.
See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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